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THE SEMANTICS OF
THE GUANTANAMO BAY INMATES:
ENEMY COMBATANTS OR PRISONERS
OF THE WAR ON TERROR?
Anne E. Joynt*
It would be a monumental understatement to say that 9/11 changed
the way the United States functions. In one day, the country's concept of
security was forever, irrevocably altered, and immediate effort was put into
making sure that nothing so terrifying would ever again happen on American soil. As the "War on Terror" has been waged domestically and abroad,
the current administration has focused on preserving the image of the
United States as a stronghold of freedom and democracy. However, the
security implied by this image comes at a monumental cost - one that is
borne most by those caught in the current rush to capture all terrorists. In
the delicate equilibrium between justice and safety, the question of human
rights threatens to tip us towards a false sense of security rather than a
fearless defense of basic individual rights.
In this conflict, the Bush administration has come down strongly on
the side of self-preservation and protection. The chosen rhetoric resounds
with such phrases as "The War on Terror" and "enemy combatants." Implicit in both examples is the image of the United States as the ultimate
warrior for democracy and safety, complete with red, white, and blue banner flying. Beneath this image is another, somewhat contradictory one of
America under attack. Though these two images may seem to be at odds, it
is their combination which provides a headier message yet: Even in times of
crisis, when the founding values of the country are under attack, the land of
the free and home of the brave rises to the occasion spectacularly, not only
preserving its ideals, but also ridding the world of terrorist threats at the
same time. The American public may be temporarily assuaged by these
representations, but, in reality, they only serve to mask the assumptions that
the administration has been acting upon. "The War on Terror" has been
waged by false accusations of weapons and conspiracy, and the "enemy
combatants" are those allegedly associated with the new mortal enemies of
the United States - the Taliban and al Qaeda. Nothing, as yet, has been
* B.A., State University of New York College at Geneseo, 2002; candidate for
J.D., University at Buffalo Law School, 2005. My thanks to Professor David
Filvaroff, Professor of Law at University at Buffalo Law School, for his help and
guidance with the development of this Note. This note reflects the position as of 1
January 2004.
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concretely proven or revealed to the public, and this very lacuna is the root
of the problem.
This has become a war of semantics, waged by and through skillful
manipulation of expression. The very term "War on Terror" is illustrative:
It has become a mere buzzword. In principle, a war that seeks to put an end
to terror is extremely difficult to oppose. Similarly, it is difficult to approach the plight of "enemy combatants" with sympathy, as they have been
virtually identified with the men who piloted planes into the World Trade
Center and Pentagon. These enemies of the state not only opposed the
United States in theory, but also have raised arms against it in an active
attempt to inflict harm. The Bush administration's classification of them
under the same rubric as the 9/11 terrorists directly associates them with the
most hated men in America - an act of classification dubious in both fact
and jurisprudence. The body of this analysis will evaluate the administration's skilful use of classification and the jurisprudential consequences that
follow. Clearly, the expressions employed in the current conflict have been
carefully designed by the administration to portray the events of September
1 lth as an attack on American values, and the alleged perpetrators as fanatics. While President Bush's administrative voice can be heard daily resonating in the media, the inmates at Guantanamo have none. These men are
alone in a foreign country, effectively cut off from the outside world, and
are at the mercy of their American captors. Theirs is not a struggle to appear sympathetic in the media, but to return to homes they never expected
to leave.
With all the smoke and mirrors inherent in the control of language,
the administration has attempted to disguise the real issue. In naming the
accused Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners "enemy combatants," the United
States is endeavoring to sidestep the Geneva Conventions and to deny many
of the captured men the privileges that would be accorded to them under
that Convention as "Prisoners of War." "Prisoner of War" is not a mere
label. Classification as such would afford the captives additional rights and
freedoms and would have a humanizing effect, effectively putting them on
par with similarly-situated soldiers held by other countries.1 Further, as developed in the next section, there is strong precedent for according the
Guantanamo Bay internees this title. The international media and human
rights organizations have roundly criticized the United States' choreographed oversight.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 [hereinafter
Geneva I] at note 30, art. 13.
I
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A close look at the question of the "enemy combatants" in the "War
on Terror" reveals the truth behind the politics at play. The United States
has overstepped its boundaries in its attempt to cleanse the world of all
terror, and has most certainly denied the detainees the justice owed to them
as human beings, while clearly not abiding by agreements previously made.
UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION

The law of war is a subset of international law governing the conduct of armed hostilities, and includes what is generally termed "humanitarian law," which protects victims of armed conflict, civilians and
noncombatants, and soldiers who are injured, ill, or captured. 2 Much of this
law is embodied in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, each of which the
3
United States has ratified.
The Third Geneva Convention provides a definition of prisoner of
war status and specifies minimum standards for the treatment of detainees.
These provisions include humane treatment; 4 adequate food, which takes

into account the prisoners' habitual diet; 5 shelter comparable to that provided the armed forces of the detaining power, including, specifically,
premises which are adequately heated and lighted and entirely protected
7
from dampness; 6 and appropriate medical care.

Perhaps most significantly with respect to the persons being held at
Guantanamo Bay, under the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war are under
no obligation to provide any information beyond basic identifying facts and
cannot be coerced into doing so. 8 According to the Conventions, detainees
Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? American
Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22 (2002).
3 Id. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75
U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct.
21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva III, supra note 1), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
4 Geneva III, supra note 1, at art. 13.
5 Id. at art. 25.
6
Id. at arts. 30, 31.
7 Id. at art. 18.
8 Saito, supra note 2, at 23.
2
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also must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities.9
Prisoners of War are defined in this Convention as:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, that fulfills
the following conditions:
a. That of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
b. That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
c. That of carrying arms openly;
d. That of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war. 10
The concept of military forces envisaged by this definition is inherently
Western. The image of the proud, straight-shouldered soldier marching into
battle, following the commander, with the country's flag flying is one often
advanced in commercials and popular depictions of the military in Western
countries. The imagined soldiers have Western faces. The reality of the
battlefield is far different. Americans often state, with pride, that our forefathers won the Revolutionary War through the use of unconventional strategies - including shooting from behind trees and engaging in guerilla
tactics." It is arrogant to assume that only militias or soldiers organized by
battalion, carrying flags into battle, are fighting the proper way - and that
only such people may be accorded prisoner of war status. Yet even the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, seemingly so slated in favor of Western culture and practices, extends protection
to the Guantanamo detainees.
Under a little-invoked clause of the Geneva Convention, "although
one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention,
9 Id.

Geneva III, supra note 1, at art. 4
11See Marshall Smelser, The Winning of Independence (Quadrangle 1972). See
also Don Higginbotham, The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and
Appraisal, The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. Ser., Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 1987),
230-273.
10
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the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual
relations."' 12 Therefore, even though the home country of the "enemy combatants" may not be a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, all other signatories are bound to afford the rights and privileges applicable there under,
and the United States is a party to the Convention. 3
Whether or not the current administration agrees that the detainees
should be given the privileges of the Geneva Convention, the Convention
additionally states that:
should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been de14
termined by a competent tribunal.
This has not been done. Despite months, and in some cases, years, of delay
in bringing the detainees to trial, none of the detainees has been brought
before a tribunal, and therefore, none have been classified.
While the Geneva Convention does not define 'enemy combatant,'
United States Supreme Court case law provides highly useful and relevant
criteria. In Ex parte Quirin, the court upheld the constitutionality of a trial
by military tribunal for eight suspected Nazi saboteurs. 15 Neither President
Franklin Roosevelt's military tribunal order denying the saboteurs access to
the courts nor the fact that the accused were enemy aliens foreclosed consideration that the Constitution and laws of the United States precluded
16
their trial by military commission.
GOVERNMENT PRODUCED DOCUMENTS: PROPAGANDA PUBLICIZED

The American government has distributed various documents that
contain arguments for the current treatment and classification of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners and rules and regulations for future trial by military
tribunals. While these documents may have been intended to stem criticism, they seem to have done the exact opposite, and are the best evidence
of the administration's efforts to stifle the rights of the detainees in an at12

Geneva III, supra note 1, at art. 2.

13

15

Id.
Id. at art. 5.
317 U.S. 1 (1942).

16

Id

14
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tempt to preserve the fiction that the terrorist threat is slowly, but surely,
being eliminated.
Fact Sheet: Status of the Detainees at Guantanamo

In a fact sheet released by White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer in February, 2002,17 the administration explained their position on
the rights afforded to both Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees. While the official stances have shifted since the release of this fact sheet, it strikingly
illustrates the administration's underlying attitude toward the detainees.
The Fact Sheet proclaims that, as neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda
were party to the Geneva Convention, prisoner of war status was not to be
conferred on either group.18 The sheet is then quick to note that though the
detainees do not technically deserve such status, they will be "provided
many prisoner of war privileges as a matter of policy."' 19 This apparently
altruistic move on the part of the United States is highly suspect, given that
it has taken it upon itself to decide unilaterally whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the two groups. 20 What follows appears to be little more than
an attempt to appease the international community into believing that the
United States government, casting itself, as ever, in the role as the eternal
'good guy,' is looking out for the best interests of the detainees, even while
these same men have only been hostile to American ideals.
Ceding to pressure, the United States pledged to treat Taliban fighters according to the standards established by the Geneva Convention for
Prisoners of War, but continued to deny that those captured in the "War on
Terror" were in fact Prisoners of War. "This reversal was attributed to Afghanistan having been a party to the Geneva Conventions, and the Taliban,
though not recognized as a legitimate government having governed much of
Afghanistan prior to its fall."'2' There may also have been political motivations for this extension of rights to Taliban fighters, stemming in part from
fears that if the United States were to deny prisoner of war status to Taliban
fighters, the Taliban might in turn deny prisoner of war status to U.S.
soldiers captured in Afghanistan.
17

Office of the White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at

Guantanamo, February 7, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html, last visited December 18, 2003.
18

Id.

Id.
20 Id.
21 Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisonersof
War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 81 (2003).
19
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While the status of the prisoners has changed somewhat since the
publication of the Fact Sheet, their day to day routine has not.22 The sheet
goes on to list what the detainees are being given at Guantanamo Bay, including three meals a day that meet Muslim dietary laws, clothing, shelter,
showers, and the opportunity to worship. 23 The detainees, the government
then vows, will not be "subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment. '24 A list is also given of what the detainees would enjoy as POWs.
However, the detainees are not afforded basic privileges such as a monthly
advance of pay, the ability to have and consult personal financial accounts,
and access to a canteen to purchase food, soap, and tobacco. 25 At several
points throughout the sheet, the public is reminded of the "severe security
risk" posed by the detainees, and that "the United States must take into
account the need for security in establishing the conditions for detention at
Guantanamo.

' 26

President Bush's Military Order and the Historical Significance of
Military Tribunals
Citing the need to maintain national security, the President released
a Military Order on November 13, 2001, which ordered that military tribunals be assembled to try the Guantanamo detainees. 27
The order reasoned that:
Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United
States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass
deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property,
and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the
28
United States Government.
President Bush further asserts that he had "determined that an extraordinary
emergency exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of

24

Id.
Id.
Id.

25

Id.

22
23

Id.
Military Order of November 13, 2001- Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16,
2001).
28 Id. at § l(c).
26

27
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this order is necessary to meet the emergency."2 9 The truth of the last statement has yet to be determined
The entire object of the presidential order is to establish rules under
which the military tribunal will operate. In order to assure his authority, the
President invokes the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title
10, United States Code.30 In his executive role as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces, 31 President Bush proceeds to dictate the role of the military tribunal.
The President sends a strong message in section 7(b), stating that
the military tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction, and that the accused "shall
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly
or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof,
(ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal. '32 In
other words, the order is giving the military tribunal, and through it the
President, supreme and unquestioned authority. By specifically disallowing
appeal to any other body, the order creates a closed system. For all intents
and purposes, power ultimately rests with the President; however, this is at
odds with the Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Quirin, where the Court
held that military commissions could be set aside by the courts when there
is "clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of
Congress constitutionally enacted." 33 Furthermore, the Court also affirmed
that "the duty ... rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of
peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil
liberty.

34

While Quirin should be persuasive, to date, the detentions at Guantanamo have resulted in two civil lawsuits in U.S. Courts in which Quirin's
holdings are ignored. The first, Coalition of Clergy v. Bush,35 was filed in
California by a group of clergy, lawyers and professors, seeking writs of
habeas corpus on behalf of those detained at Camp X-Ray. However, the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that the petitioners lacked standing, and that the court lacked the jurisdiction to enter-

30

Id. at § 1(g).
Id. at 57,833.

31

U.S. CONST. art.

29

II, § 2.

Military Order of November 13, 2001 at § 7(b).
33 Ex parte Quirin, supra note 15, at 25.
32

34

Id.

35

310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002).
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tain the claims. 36 Furthermore, it was decided that no federal court could
exercise jurisdiction over the issue. 37
The second case was filed by the relatives of several Guantanamo
Bay detainees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Rasul
v. Bush38 was eventually dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, with the reasoning that because the aliens held at Guantanamo Bay were outside the territory of the United States, writs of habeas corpus were not available. 39
Both courts were quick to point out that although relief was not
possible under United States laws, there were other legal protections to
which the detainees might be entitled. 40 In fact, the Rasul court cautioned
that its opinion "should not be read as stating that these aliens do not have
'41
some form of rights under international law."
While the court desperately attempted to retain as much power as
possible in these proceedings, the deviation from the principles in Quirin is
further indicative of the current mindset of the courts, as well as the country. For many, it is easier to risk someone else's human rights in exchange
for a little security. The choice to forfeit liberty for security, however,
brings with it a number of other problems, and the question then becomes
where to draw the line.
Far from granting the accused any rights, the President's order
seeks to repress any that could be assumed. In fact, the order goes so far as
to clearly state that "this order is not intended to and does not create any
right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or
equity by any party, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or
other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person. '42 Clearly, the
rights of the government, in this instance, are at the cost of the accused, and
rather than seeking to grant or protect any rights which might make this
series of court cases a fair fight, this order is a clear effort to circumvent any
attempt by defendants to retain rights-based defenses.
The Order closes on a similar note. Section 7(e) reserves to the
President, as the head of the military,
authority to direct the Secretary of Defense, at any time
hereafter, to transfei to a governmental authority control of
36

Id.

37
38

Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 21, at 80.
215 F.Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).

39

Id.

,o Id.
40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 32, at § 7(c).
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any individual subject to this order. Nothing in this order
shall be construed to limit the authority of any such governmental authority to prosecute any individual for whom con43
trol is transferred.

This simply serves to reaffirm the unquestionable power that is granted both
to the military and its commander.
The international community is well justified in questioning the
President's right to grant himself such power, and the legality of this order
is even tenuous under the United States Constitution. Section 2 of Article II
proclaims the President to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and also gives him the power to grant reprieves
and pardons for offenses against the United States." While some may argue that these tribunals are a mere extension of the President's duty as
Commander in Chief of the military, others would counter that this, in
terms, is an act that overrides separation of powers by excluding the legislature and judiciary from evaluating the situation of the Guantanamo detainees. Neither the judiciary nor the legislature was consulted or considered
when the tribunals were constructed. The President's attempt to protect
American ideals has, in a sense, violated them.
Military Tribunals as Opposed to Civilian Courts
Generally, many of the protections afforded defendants in civilian
court do not apply in military proceedings. 45 For example, convictions in
civilian courts must be unanimous, while military tribunals may convict by
a two-thirds majority. 46 Different rules of evidence apply, with lower standards for admission in military tribunals. 47 Defendants are not guaranteed
the right to appeal against convictions in military tribunals. 48 Also, civilian
trials must be open to the public, while military tribunals can be held in
secret. 49
As the Taliban detainees were classified as prisoners of war, they
will not face the military tribunal, and will instead face a court martial pur43

Id. at § 7(e).

44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
45 US Terror Trials Condemned, BBC

News, July 4, 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/americas/3044278.stm, last visited December 18, 2003.
46 Id.
47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.
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suant to Article 82 of the Geneva Convention, 50 which states that, "A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been
pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the
case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. ' 51
As international legal scholar Jordan Paust points out, U.S. military
commissions must, at the very least, comply with Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 52 which establishes a minimum set of customary and treaty-based human rights to due process - rights
guaranteed to all persons in all circumstances by customary international
law, the International Covenant, and thus also by and through Articles 55(c)
and 56 of the U.N. Charter. 53 These rights include the general right of all
persons "in full equality" to "a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law,' 54 the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty; 55 the right to be informed "promptly
and in detail in a language the accused understands of the nature and cause
of the charge against him;" the right "to have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his
own choosing; '56 the right "to be tried without undue delay;" the right "to
be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his choosing;" the right "to examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf;" '57 the right "to have the free assistance of an interpreter;" the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt;" and the right to have "his conviction and sen58
tence... reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law."
Essentially, the ICCPR would endow the detainees with many of
the advantages and privileges they would have in a civilian trial. Disappointingly, the Bush administration has defied long-established principles
50

Geneva III, supra note 1, at art. 102.

51

Id.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, Art. 6(5),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
52

53 See generally Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: CourtingIlle-

gality, 23 MIcH. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2001).
54 ICCPR, supra note 52, at note 25, art. 14, p. 1. The press and public can be
excluded for particular reasons, for example, to protect "public order or national
security in a democratic society." Id.
55 Id. at note 25, art. 14, p. 2.

56 Id. at note 25, art. 14, p. 3(a)-(b).
57 Id. at note 25, art. 14, p. 3(c)-(e).
58

Id. at note 25, art. 14, p. 3(f)-(g).
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of human rights, and refused to extend any of these rights to the Guantanamo inmates.
Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1

Following in a vein similar to President Bush's military tribunal
59
order is the Department of Defense's Military Commission Order.
In detailing the makeup of the military commission, this Order requires that the judges serving on the tribunal be "commissioned officers of
the United States armed forces, including without limitation reserve personnel on active duty, National Guard personnel on active duty in Federal service, and retired personnel recalled to active duty. 60 No knowledge of the
law is explicitly required. 6' By conventional standards, this is shocking.
Under the Military Commission Order, any 18-year-old soldier could be
appointed, regardless of ignorance of the law, its norms, and a lack of life
experience. This court is run by those of military education rather than
those of legal education. 62 The resulting distinction is great, and has a huge
impact on the procedures and outcomes of the trials.
In terms of counsel, the Order requires that the Chief Prosecutor
and the Chief Defense be judge advocates of the United States Armed
Forces. 63 Furthermore, the Order also gives to the accused the right to retain the services of a civilian attorney at his own cost. 64 The outside counsel provision is further restricted. For instance, the chosen attorney must be
a United States citizen, and must be cleared for SECRET clearance. 65 However, the civilian attorney is not privy to all information, 66 and therefore
would not be operating with full knowledge of his client's situation.
Sprinkled throughout the Order are references to "national security"
and the need to protect both those involved in the trial and the country from
any harm.67 The blanket concept of "national security" is repeatedly invoked to justify broad extensions of power, a favored means of slipping
questionable procedure under the human rights radar. To these ends, the
59 Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002
§ 4(A)(3).
60

Id.

61

64

Id.
Id.
Id. at § 4(A)(4).
Id. at § 4(C)(3).

65

Id.

62

63

66

Id.

67

Id.
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Commission is given the right to close a proceeding or portion of the trial to
the accused, the civilian defense counsel, or any other person except the
Chief Defense Counsel. 68 This runs contrary to the notion of justice as protected by the United States Constitution, wherein the accused has the right
to be confronted with the witnesses standing against him, 69 and it also infringes on the right of counsel. 70 In many ways, the Commission's concession of allowing civilian counsel is far outweighed by the unusual and
prejudicial burdens that such counsel would bear.
In summary, this order, from presidential conception to military realization, clearly is turning the tribunal into a closed affair. In the end, it is
the military that defends, prosecutes, and judges the accused, and it is the
military that imposes the sentence through to completion.
THE PROBLEM OF THE U.S. CITIZEN ENEMY COMBATANTS

In 1971, Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Act, 7 1 which
was part of the Internal Security Act of 1950,72 by writing into 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) the provision that "no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress. ' ' 73 At
the time, the act represented a legitimate response to the outrage over the
executive internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, which
was carried out pursuant only to a presidential order. 74 Furthermore, the
1981 Supreme Court decision Howe v. Smith,75 involving the transfer of
state prisoners to federal custody, conclusively stated that § 4001(a) applies
to all U.S. citizens regardless of "enemy combatant" status. 76 Howe further
helped to establish an unequivocal standard for § 4001(a): It applies to any
federal detention of a U.S. citizen, and such detentions are manifestly illegal if not legislatively authorized. 77 A close reading of these cases as well
as the legislative intent of § 4001(a) clearly reveals that the provision was
explicitly meant to limit the President's power to detain U.S. citizens, and
68

Id. at § 6(D)(5).
amend. VI.

69 U.S. CONST.,
70

Id.

71

Pub. L. No. 81-831, tit. II, § 102, 64 Stat. 1019, 1021 (repealed 1971).
Pub. L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).

72

18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
Stephen I. Vladeck, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and
the Detention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112 YALE L.J. 961 (2003).
75 452 U.S. 473 (1981).
76 Vladeck, supra note 74, at 961.
77 Id. at 963.
73

74

440

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

so has a large role to play in the pending cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and
Padilla v. Bush.79 Both of these cases illustrate the ultimate consequences
of the current administration's abrogation of the Geneva Convention.
Yasser Esam Hamdi was transferred to U.S. custody from the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. 80 He was subsequently transferred to Camp X-Ray, the temporary detention facility for
non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in January 2002, before it was determined that he was an American citizen. Hamdi was then transferred to
the Naval Brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where he has since been held without
charges. 8'
Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber," was arrested on a material witness warrant outside O'Hare Airport in Chicago on May 8, 2002.82
Padilla remained in civilian custody for a little over a month before he was
detention in
determined an "enemy combatant" and transferred to military
83
the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.
CONCLUSION

Clearly, the detention of the Taliban and al Qaeda inmates in Guantanamo Bay violates international norms and treaties, as well as established
United States law. As Alexander Hamilton warned when the United States
was formed, "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, [has] been, in all
ages, the favorite and most formidable instrument of tyranny." 84 The constitutional separation of powers and the international legitimacy it affords
our nation will be threatened until such a time as international commitments
are honored and rights are not withheld from some in order to give a sense
of security to the masses.
The government of the United States must rectify the wrong done
immediately by declaring the detainees at Guantanamo Bay POWs as defined by the Geneva Convention. While the relative guilt or innocence of
78

296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2003).

79

233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3,Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (E.D. Va. June
11, 2002)(No. 02-439), available at http: news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/
hamdirums6llO2pet.pdf, last visited December 18, 2003.
81
Id. at note 16.
82 See Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4-5, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2002) (No. 02-4445), available at http://news.
findlaw.con/hdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush6l9, last visited December 18, 2003.
83 Id. at note 17.
84 Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 H~Av. INT'L L.J. 503 (2003).
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each individual inmate has yet to be determined, the fair treatment of these
men now will give credence and legitimacy to evidence and convictions
that may develop later. If the United States wishes to perpetuate a lasting
commitment to the end of all forms of terrorism, then the endeavor should
begin with a focused attempt to do so to the letter of the law, thereby serving as testimony to the United States' dedication both to human rights and
to each person's interest in living life free from the fear of terrorism.

